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Abstract  
 
It has been argued that the opaqueness of structured bonds such as Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), and Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) was one of the 
major causes of the recent financial crisis that started in late 2007. In this article, we analyze the 
evolving nature of the opaqueness of structured bonds by examining U.S. insurers’ assets from a 
capital markets perspective. We show that, before 2005, the market did not view structured 
bonds as opaque investments; however, after 2005, the market began to perceive multi-class 
structured bonds, especially private bonds, as opaque assets. In addition, by investigating the 
rating grades of such structured bonds, we find that the market views lower-grade, private, multi-
class structured bonds as the most opaque assets. Additionally, publicly traded multi-class 
structured bonds with superior ratings are also considered opaque. This result provides a useful 
foundation for the reform of credit rating agencies.  
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Introduction  
The burst of the latest real estate market bubble in 2007 soon turned into a liquidity and credit 
crisis in financial markets. Many papers point out that one of the most important factors that 
caused the crisis was the opaqueness of structured bonds, such as Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), and Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) (e.g., Dionne, 
2009; Harrington, 2009; Scott and Taylor, 2009; Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane, 2010; Ryan, 
2008). Yet, little research has been done to empirically investigate such products and understand 
the nature of their opaqueness. Previous literature, such as Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran 
(2004) and Zhang, Cox and Van Ness (2009), investigates the opaqueness of banking firms’ 
assets and the opaqueness of asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities of insurance companies. 
However, these papers do not distinguish structured bonds from other corporate bonds and 
government bonds in their analyses.  
The insurance industry, as an important sector of the financial services industry, has been a 
big investor in structured bonds (Liebenberg, Colquitt, and Hollans, 2010; IMF, 2008; Manconi, 
Massa, and Yasuda, 2010). Some big insurance companies even fell into financial trouble 
because of heavy investment in such bonds.1 The lack of empirical research on the opaqueness of 
structured bonds, the importance of structured bonds for insurance firms, and the rich data 
available for the U.S. insurance industry have prompted us to examine the opaqueness of 
                                      
1 For example, Scottish Re (U.S.) Inc. was put under supervision in January 2009 by the Delaware Insurance 
Commissioner, mainly because of its declining asset values from residential mortgage backed securities. Before 
running into financial trouble, as of December 31, 2007, MBSs and CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations) 
constituted approximately 19.3% of the firm’s invested assets. 
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structured bonds in this article, which extends the existing literature to provide empirical 
evidence of the opaqueness of structured products. 
The volume of literature on analyzing the causes and consequences of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis has been rapidly growing. One such cause, the declining value of subprime 
mortgage-related assets, was the apparent trigger for the recent financial turmoil. Therefore, one 
side of the current literature discusses why the proportion of subprime mortgages rapidly 
increased, why the delinquencies of mortgages rose, why financial institutions securitized 
mortgages, why there were high demands for the structured bonds, and so forth (e.g., Wilmarth, 
2009; Krohn and Gruver, 2008; Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell, 2008). These papers 
usually point out the lax underwriting standards; a long-lasting, low interest rate in the 2000s; 
competitive pressure for high yields; errors made by rating agencies in risk modeling; and greedy 
participants in the financial market as the causes of the rapidly grown mortgage-backed 
securities, along with other changing institutional, political, and regulatory environments after 
the early 2000s. 
The other side of the literature investigates how the relatively small size of subprime 
mortgages losses can be amplified into a worldwide financial crisis (e.g., Murphy, 2008; Hellwig, 
2009; Schwarcz, 2009). The estimated loss in subprime mortgage-backed-securities was about 
$500 billion dollars, which is smaller than the technology bubble loss in 2000 (Hellwig, 2009). 
These papers argue that lost credibility in the structure process (notably the credibility of rating 
agencies), financial institutions’ high leverage, and opaqueness of the structure process are the 
causes of this amplification. This raises an empirical question of how opaque these structured 
products are to the market. Does the market take into consideration the opaqueness of such assets 
when valuing a firm? So far, systematic empirical research on these questions has been lacking.  
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In the past decade, the growing popularity of securitizing and structuring mortgage-
related products has allowed mortgage originators to share and transfer the housing price and 
credit risk among various investors: banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, and 
pension funds. However, the spreading and sharing of risks have been done in very complex and 
opaque ways. There are two related but different transparency issues. One is the opaqueness of 
off-balance sheet securitization, which makes the issuers opaque, and the other is the opaqueness 
of structured bonds, which makes the investors opaque.  
Assessing the risks of issuers is particularly difficult because many use off-balance sheet 
entities. Risks are technically transferred through quasi-separated conduits and Structured 
Investment Vehicles (SIVs). However, since the issuers are still responsible for the liquidity risk 
of off-balance sheet entities, the risks are not completely transferred. In reality, the degree of risk 
retention is continuous from complete risk transfer to almost full risk retention, and the 
information on the degree of risk retention is not fully disclosed.2 Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Neamtiu 
(2010) test the opaqueness of securitization to the issuers and find that off-balance sheet 
securitization increases the opaqueness of the issuers.  
The other source of opaqueness of structured bonds is the opaqueness of the structured bond 
itself. The nature of the structure process, such as pooling, structuring, and re-structuring, makes 
it extremely difficult to track the impact of mortgage loan losses on the losses of final structured 
products. It becomes even harder to estimate the increased risks when structured bonds are part 
of the underlying assets of other structured bonds such as CDOs. Furthermore, the most 
complicated CDOs are only sold through private placements, where only registered investors can 
                                      
2 There are two financial reporting techniques for securitization: sales (off-balance sheet) and secured borrowing 
(on-balance sheet). When a firm uses the off-balance sheet technique, the balance sheet of the issuers does not fully 
disclose the recourse obligation, servicing requirements, and, of course, the implicit responsibility arising from 
reputation management. 
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review the details of the deal.3  As a result, investment in such assets tends to increase the 
opaqueness of a firm to investors. 
Dealing with the opaqueness of structured bonds has become a focus of insurance regulation 
since start of the recent crisis. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
formed a Rating Agency Working Group of the NAIC Financial Condition Committee (hereafter 
“the group”) on February 11, 2009. The group has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of 
state insurance regulatory use of the credit ratings on structured securities and municipal bonds 
provided by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, including Standard & Poor's, 
Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, A.M. Best, and Realpoint. The group recommends developing 
alternative methodologies for assessing structured security risks and reducing regulators’ reliance 
on credit ratings, which the group views to be less than reliable for various reasons. Additionally, 
the group recommends the development of standards, greater standardization of definitions, 
greater consistency in the agreements used for structured securities, and so forth (McRaith et al., 
2010).   
Given the importance of structured bonds in insurance companies’ solvency and performance, 
it is important to investigate several matters: how opaque the structured bonds are to insurance 
companies’ investors; when the market begins to view such investments as opaque assets; what 
kind of structured bonds make insurance companies’ balance sheets more opaque and risky; and 
whether credit rating can adequately reduce the opaqueness of such products. Therefore, the goal 
of this paper is to empirically address the opaqueness of different types of structured bonds in 
insurance companies’ assets, as well as their impacts on the valuation of these companies.  
                                      
3 The complexity of CDOs and CDO squared are well described in Mason and Rosner (2007).  
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We explore the opaqueness of structured bonds by using data from the insurance industry for 
several reasons. First, we can better estimate the opaqueness of structured bonds by using 
homogenous insurance companies without being contaminated by cross-industry effects. For 
instance, banks are both investors and issuers of structured bonds. Therefore, both the 
opaqueness of off-balance sheet securitization and the opaqueness of the product itself exist. 
Hedge funds and investment banks are unregulated; therefore, they tend to hold riskier tranches 
of structured bonds than insurers. This systemic difference among financial institutions may 
create noise in empirical estimations. Insurers, on the other hand, are mostly involved in 
structured bond transactions as investors and not as originators.  As a result, we can estimate 
more accurately the pure opaqueness of the structured bonds themselves without dramatic 
contamination from opaque off-balance sheet financial reporting.4   
Secondly, insurance companies are traditionally one of the largest investors of mortgage-
backed securities, along with pension funds, hedge funds, and banks (IMF, 2008; Manconi, 
Massa, and Yasuda, 2010). The long duration of insurers’ liability and the relatively long terms 
of mortgage-backed securities make insurers the ideal investors for mortgage-backed securities. 
Furthermore, AAA- and AA-rated bonds with higher yields than other corporate bonds or T-bills 
are very attractive options to insurers whose investment options are limited and strictly regulated 
by the NAIC. As a result, studying the opaqueness of structured bonds will provide practical 
reference for insurance regulators, customers and investors.  
Lastly, insurance companies are a homogenous group in terms of financial reporting. All 
insurance companies need to report to the NAIC. The reported structured bonds-related data is 
                                      
4 AIG and monoline insurers are exceptions because they were also involved in the crisis by “insuring” mortgage-
related securities. We conduct robustness tests by singling out these insurers, which does not change our results.     
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therefore standardized and more detailed. The standardized NAIC database provides holding 
information on publicly traded and privately placed single-class and multi-class structured bonds. 
In addition, it provides rating information for multi-class structured bonds, which enables us to 
conduct further analysis of the effectiveness of rating on reducing the opaqueness of such 
products.  
In this paper, we first examine the amount of structured bonds held by insurance companies 
during the ten-year period from 1998 to 2008. Secondly, we investigate whether structured bonds 
are opaque to evaluate for investors by using a sample of publicly traded life-health (L/H) and 
property-casualty (P/C) insurance companies. Specifically we explore the effects of structured 
bond holdings on the bid-ask spread and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion by controlling for 
other opaqueness factors of assets and liabilities and market microstructure factors. The analysis 
is conducted for two sub-periods: from 1998 to 2004, when structured products are less 
complicated and not as prevalent in the market; and from 2005 to 2008, when the market 
observed a proliferation of such products. In this way, we can understand to what extent the 
increase in informational uncertainty regarding insurance companies during the financial crisis is 
associated with structured bond holdings. In addition, we investigate whether credit ratings of 
structured bonds carry useful information and reduce the opaqueness to the investors. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the complexity 
of structured bonds and structured bond holdings in insurers’ assets. We then describe our data 
and methodology, followed by presenting the empirical results. The last section concludes the 
paper.  
Structured Bonds  
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“Structured” finance generally refers to financial products created by pooling various underlying 
risks (such as mortgage loans or auto loans) and slicing them into different “tranches,” a French 
word for “slice.” For example, typical Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) are 
created in the following way: issuers, typically government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such 
as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), 
first acquire mortgage loans from mortgage originators, then pool the mortgage loans, securitize 
them into bonds, and sell them to investors. If the asset pools are not sliced, the losses from 
underlying assets simply “pass-through” to the final products, and they are called pass-through 
MBS. By turning the illiquid cash flows into tradable bonds, securitization provides a new way 
to sell loans and enhances the liquidity of the housing market, thus making homeownership more 
affordable.  
Securitization, then, has evolved into a more creative way of structuring. Issuers slice the 
pools into several—at least three—subordinated tranches with different risks. The highest quality 
tranche, the senior tranche with the AAA rating, gets the lowest return. The next tranche, at the 
mezzanine level, is usually rated A- to BBB, and the rest is equity tranche (or “toxic waste”), 
which is non-rated. The cash flows from underlying assets first pay off the senior level, then the 
mezzanine, and so on. With this structure, the equity level absorbs most of the losses.  
Structured bonds are not standardized. Some are structured by default risks, while others are 
structured by prepayment risks. Furthermore, tranches often include more sophisticated features 
such as interest-only strips and principal-only strips. RMBS are backed by residential mortgage 
loans, and CMBS are backed by commercial property mortgage loans. Similarly, the underlying 
assets of ABS may consist of auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, equipment loans, etc. 
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Issuers sell the senior tranche to buyers, and then recycle the less popular mezzanine and equity 
tranches by using them as underlying assets for other structured bonds called CDOs.  
Unlike MBS, CDOs pool various risks, including mortgages, corporate bonds, auto loans, 
credit card loans, and other structured bonds. By pooling risks that are considered to be not 
highly correlated and by adding credit default swap (CDS) or bond insurance on top of them, the 
risks of CDOs—which consist of bad-quality underlying assets—are considered to be 
significantly lowered. As a result, the default probabilities of CDOs were considered fairly low. 
(Mason and Rosner, 2007). CDOs, the most complex structured bonds, are only sold through 
private placement with confidentiality. The process does not stop there. The mezzanine and 
equity trenches of CDOs are again sold and repackaged to make CDO-squared. Figure 1 presents 
the growth and increased complexity of structured bonds. CDO issuance increased from 68 
billion dollars in 2000 to 521 billion dollars in 2006. Furthermore, the complexity of CDO 
increased over time. In 2000, only 1.5 percent of underlying assets of CDOs were structured 
bonds, but the number jumped to 63 percent in 2005.  
Securitization separates mortgage originators and investors. By doing so, mortgage 
originators have less incentive to screen the quality of risks and monitor them. The increasing 
profits generated through securitization attracted non-agency institutions like Wall Street 
investment banks into this business. GSEs originally only acquired “qualified” good-risk 
mortgages, but non-agency issuers accepted high-risk mortgages as well. As a result, toxic assets 
like subprime mortgages and Alt-As (Alternative A-paper)5 flooded into the underlying asset 
pools of structured products. This change occurred very quickly. The total amount of outstanding 
subprime and Alt-A MBS was 125 billion dollars in 2000, which accounted for four percent of 
                                      
5 A type of U.S. mortgage, the risk level of which lies between prime loans and subprime loans.  
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the total MBS outstanding; the number grew to 1.6 trillion dollars in 2007, which was 25 percent 
of the total MBS outstanding (Gorton, 2009). What is even worse is that these toxic assets were 
first securitized as MBS, and then some of them flooded into the most complex CDOs. UBS 
Bank examined 420 CDOs that had structured bonds as collaterals and found that 83 percent of 
the residential MBS in CDOs were subprime and Alt-A (Gorton, 2009).6  
With the fanatic pace of growth and the complexity of structuring, the most sophisticated 
rating agencies are the only ones left that could potentially or still attempted to estimate the risk 
of structured bonds. As a result, the investors of such products relied more than ever on bond 
ratings, rather than trying to understand the risk of underlying assets. Institutions that held 
structured bonds also used the rating information to value their assets. Unfortunately, even the 
most sophisticated rating agencies failed to catch up with the winds of change and provide 
quality estimation of the risks. In fact, the close relationship between credit rating agencies and 
Wall Street bond issuers may have led them to engineer the risks of the highest senior tranche 
right above the AAA boundary line, making the portfolio less resistant than expected to the 
default risk of underlying assets. The series of rating downgrades during the 2008-2009 period 
has raised questions about the credibility of rating agencies. Many pointed out that the market’s 
dependency on rating agencies and these agencies’ seriously undermined credibility contributed 
to the prolonged financial crisis (Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane, 2010). As a result, the 
newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 imposed new requirements and oversights on credit 
rating agencies. This phenomenon also makes it interesting to test if the market fully trusts the 
rating grades of structured bonds provided by such agencies, a test which should shed some light 
on the necessity of rating agency reform. 
                                      
6 Official data on total subprime and Alt-A MBS exposures in CDOs are not available because all CDOs are 
privately placed.  
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Structured Bonds in Insurers’ Assets and Hypotheses Tested 
Insurance companies, especially life insurance companies, are traditionally major purchasers of 
MBS. Long-term bonds are a good match for the long-term liabilities of life insurance companies. 
Although there are prepayment risks, the most common type of residential mortgage loan is a 30-
year loan. Accordingly, typical MBS also has long maturity on average.7     
In addition, a period of record low interest rates following a high-interest rate period presents 
a big challenge for life insurance companies, because the guaranteed rate of return for insurance 
products (made at the time when interest rate was high), such as permanent life insurance 
products and annuities, is higher than the actual interest rate. The low interest rate, combined 
with extended life expectancy, increases insurers’ demand for investment products with higher 
yields. Structured bonds provide higher yields than other corporate bonds or treasury bonds but 
still have the same AAA ratings, which technically do not increase the amount of risk-based 
capital of an insurance company.8  Given the strict investment guidelines imposed by the NAIC, 
AAA- and AA-rated structured bonds that can comfortably fall within the NAIC-1 rating become 
very attractive investment options for insurance companies. According to Goldman Sachs’ 
estimation, insurers held about 26 percent of subprime exposures ($84 billion), second only to 
the banks’ 39 percent of subprime exposures ($127 billion) (IMF, 2008).   
Table 1 shows the structured bond investment information for the life-health and the 
property-casualty industries over the 1998-2008 period. Structured bonds include both single-
class MBS/ABS and multi-class MBS/ABS/CDOs. Single-class bonds are non-sliced pass-
                                      
7 According to Vink and Thibeault (2008), the average MBS matures in just over 27.7 years. They use non-U.S. 
MBS data only.  
8 The typical coupon rate for AAA-rated CDOs is about LIBOR+26 bps, LIBOR+75 bps for A-rated CDOs, 
LIBOR+180 for BBB-rated CDOs, and LIBOR+475 for BB-rated CDOs (Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi, 2006).  
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throughs, and multi-class bonds represent the rest of the structured products. Insurers’ 
investments in multi-class structured bonds more than doubled from 1998 to 2006. In total, the 
insurance industry (both L/H and P/C) invested about $444 billion in structured bonds in 1998, 
and that number increased to $1.1 trillion in 2006.9  
The table shows that in the life-health industry, the percentage of firms with investment in 
single class structured bonds (57% in 1998 and 68% in 2005) and multi-class structured bonds 
(42% in 1998 and 54% in 2005) has increased over time. When looking at the structured bond 
holdings as a percentage of total assets for a median firm in this industry, we find that the 
percentage of single-class structured bonds has not changed much over time. However, the 
percentage of multi-class structured bonds has increased dramatically and reached double digits 
during the 2005-2008 period (from an average 8.95% during 1998-2004 to an average 11.27% 
during 2005-2008). 
The percentage of property-liability insurers that hold structured bonds is not as high as that 
of life-health insurers and shows no sign of increase over time. For P/C insurers with structured 
bond investments, the median percentage of structured bond holdings to total assets stably 
increases over time. The percentage reached more than six percent during the 2005-2008 period 
for both single-class and multi-class bonds.  
In sum, life-health insurance companies hold more structured bonds than property-casualty 
insurance companies do in terms of both absolute amount and percentage of assets, which is 
consistent with the asset-liability duration-matching incentive of life insurers.   
The apparent downside for insurance company investment in structured bonds is the 
complexity and opaqueness of such bonds. The complicated nature of structured products makes 
                                      
9 These numbers are in 2005 dollars.  
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it very difficult for insurers to understand and value them. Although a higher yield with the 
NAIC-1 rating is very attractive, some insurers could be reluctant to take this option because 
they are not capable of understanding these products and risks associated with them. This 
argument is consistent with that of Liebenberg, Colquitt, and Hollans (2010), who find that a 
significant number of insurers do not invest in RMBS at all; and Baranoff and Sager (2009), who 
find that many life insurers fail to adjust capital to accommodate the increased risk of structured 
bonds.  
The difficulty of valuing structured bonds is not limited to structured bond purchasers; it 
could be even more difficult for investors to value insurance companies that have structured 
bond holdings. Although all insurers in the U.S. report total structured bond holdings in Statutory 
Annual Statements, the reported value is still opaque due to the aforementioned nature of these 
products. Private multi-class structured bonds are probably the most opaque to investors because 
they are highly structured and tailored, which makes it almost impossible for outsiders to 
understand their real risk by simply looking at the reported values. Borrowers and lenders 
negotiate the lending terms and conditions, and lenders have a right to monitor borrowers closely, 
but the deal information is usually not disclosed to other parties. 10 On top of that, the most 
complex type of multi-class structured bonds, CDOs, are only issued in over-the-counter markets. 
We therefore hypothesize that holding more structured bonds, particularly privately placed multi-
class bonds, increases the information gap between insurers and their investors, which increases 
the opaqueness of insurance firms. 
                                      
10 Publicly traded companies may disclose more information on private bonds to their investors in their SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) reports, but the details are not standardized, and the disclosure level is up 
to individual companies. 
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As described above, insurance company investments are subject to investment guidelines 
from the NAIC, which restricts their investments in non-graded or risky bonds. Investments in 
structured bonds should also follow these same rules. The NAIC used to rely on credit ratings 
from rating agencies for publicly traded bonds and apply their own risk ratings for privately 
placed bonds (Kwan and Carleton, 2004)11. Given the proposed change by the NAIC about using 
credit ratings for structured bonds after the financial crisis, it will be interesting to investigate 
whether the existing rating system provides useful information to the market. As such, we 
examine the opaqueness of structured bonds that are NAIC-1 rated and those that are rated 
NAIC-2 and below. We predict that if the market believes in the credit ratings, then structured 
bonds (public or private) with an NAIC-1 rating will be less opaque, while those with below an 
NAIC-1 rating will add opaqueness to insurance stocks. However, if the market has less 
confidence in the public rating agencies, the publicly traded NAIC-1 rating bonds will not be as 
transparent to the market as their ratings indicate.  
Data and Methodology  
Data and Sample Selection 
The sample studied in this paper includes publicly traded U.S. insurers. The initial list of publicly 
traded insurers is drawn from COMPUSTAT and CRSP (Center for Research in Securities 
Prices). Firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with an SIC code identifying them as 
insurance companies are included in the study (SIC code: 6311-6399, excepting agencies and 
                                      
11 Moody’s AAA/AA/A and S&P AAA/AA/A correspond to an NAIC-1 rating. Moody’s BAA and S&P BBB and 
lower ratings correspond to an NAIC-2 rating and lower.  
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brokers).12 Our sample period is January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2008. This initial sample 
is matched with the NAIC database using company names, licensed states, and subsidiary 
information.  
We collect firms’ structured bonds data and other financial information primarily from the 
NAIC database because only limited information is available from COMPUSTAT as compared 
to the NAIC. Our study is at the group and unaffiliated single firm level. We consolidate a firm’s 
property-casualty and life-health operations by group code. To guarantee that our sample is 
restricted to insurance firms only, we exclude companies whose consolidated total assets from 
the NAIC is less than 50 percent of COMPUSTAT’s total assets. The final sample includes 205 
firms with 1134 firm-years of data.  
We extract data on bid-ask spread, stock price, trading volume, and stock returns from CRSP. 
We also use the I/B/E/S database to obtain the number of analysts and dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.     
Opaqueness Measures 
The first opaqueness measure used in this study is the bid-ask spread. Numerous market 
microstructure studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence that one rationale for the 
existence of bid-ask spreads is information asymmetry in the stock market (Bagehot, 1971; Kyle, 
1985; and Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). It is argued that market makers post the bid (the price at 
which a stock can be sold) and ask prices (the price at which a stock can be bought) in such a 
                                      
12
 COMPUSTAT and CRSP have slightly different SIC code records. When either COMPUSTAT or CRSP does not 
report an insurance SIC code, we check business information manually from the 10-K report available in the 
SEC’s EDGAR database for that year.   
17 
 
way that the expected profit from trades can be zero, despite the fact that informed traders buy or 
sell stocks only if the trading is profitable for them. In other words, the market maker, who 
generally cannot distinguish between informed traders and uninformed traders, recovers losses 
incurred in trades with informed traders through gains in trades with uninformed traders by 
maintaining the bid-ask spreads. As a result, stocks with higher levels of information asymmetry 
should have bigger bid-ask spreads. 
The relative opaqueness of assets and liabilities of financial institutions has been shown 
to affect bid-ask spreads in the stock market. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) adopt 
bid-ask spreads as opaqueness measures and show that, after controlling for market 
microstructure factors and other financial characteristics, bid-ask spreads are associated with 
opaque bank assets, such as bank loans. Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009), by studying publicly 
traded insurance companies, also show that more opaque underwriting liability results in greater 
spreads.  In this study, we follow previous literature and adopt the following quoted spreads 
(QSPREAD) as a measure of opaqueness.  






=
t
tt
MP
Bid-Ask
QSPREAD avg
,   (1)
 
where tAsk  
is daily closing ask price, tBid  
is daily closing bid price, and tMP is the average of 
tAsk  and tBid . QSPREAD is an average of daily bid-ask spreads for the first quarter. We use 
the first quarter data because only annual data is available from NAIC. We link previous year-
end NAIC data with the first quarter average bid-ask spreads for the following year.  
The second opaqueness measure is analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion (DISP). Analysts’ 
earnings forecast dispersion is broadly used as a measure of asymmetric information and 
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uncertainty about asset value in many studies (e.g., Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran, 2004; 
Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr, 2001; Thomas, 2002; Zhang, 2006). If an insurance company’s 
assets and liabilities are opaque, and thus more difficult for analysts to value, the analysts should 
more often disagree on the forecasts of earnings. Following Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009), 
we measure analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of one-year earnings 
forecasts divided by the median forecast. Stocks with fewer than two analysts following are 
excluded when we use DISP as an opaqueness measure.  
Structured Bond Variables 
Schedule D, Part 1A Section 2 of the NAIC annual statement provides the aggregate value of 
publicly and privately traded bonds and their breakdown to non-structured bonds, single-class 
structured bonds, and multi-class structured bonds. Our primary interest is in the opaqueness of 
private and public multi-class structured bonds, which consists of RMBS, CMBS, ABS, and 
CDOs. The statement also provides the credit rating information of such bonds, which enables us 
to test whether the damaged credibility of rating agencies increases the opaqueness of rated 
structured products over time.  
Methodology 
We run the fixed effects panel regression to examine the opaqueness of structured bonds in 
insurers’ assets. A robust regression method is adopted to accommodate the appearance of 
outliers and non-normality issues of data.13 We run separate analyses for the period of 1998-2004, 
                                      
13 Robust regression method uses an iteratively reweighted least squares estimation method. It assigns higher 
weights to better-behaved observations and can drop extreme cases, e.g., those with Cook's D greater than 1, 
from the regression. This method can achieve the efficiency of OLS with ideal data and performs substantially 
better than OLS in non-ideal situations (e.g., data with non-normal errors or outliers) (Hamilton, 2003). 
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which we call the early period of structured bonds, and the period of 2005-2008, which we call 
the growing period of the structured bonds. This way, we are able to see whether the market’s 
view of the opaqueness of such products changes over time. In particular, the model specification 
is as follows:  
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 where 
OPAQUE        = the average quoted bid-ask spread (QSPREAD) or the analysts’ earnings 
forecast dispersion (DISP) 
PUBSINGLE  = the ratio of total publicly traded, single-class structured bonds to total assets 
PRISINGLE    = the ratio of total privately placed, single-class structured bonds to total assets   
PUBMULTI    = the ratio of total publicly traded, multi-class structured bonds to total assets 
PRIMULTI      = the ratio of total privately placed, multi-class structured bonds to total assets   
OOPAQUE      = the ratio of investment in mortgage, real estate, and non-structured private 
bonds to total assets 
PCOPA            = the ratio of premiums in long-tail lines, mortgage guarantees, financial 
guarantees, and credit lines to total premiums  
LHOPA            = the ratio of premiums in individual life, individual annuity, and credit life to 
total premiums  
FINHOLD        = a dummy variable equal to one if an insurer is a financial holding company      
and zero otherwise.14 
LASSET          = log of total assets 
LEVER            = debt to asset ratio 
GROWTH       = log of (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of asset 
                                      
14 Following Egginton et al. (2010), we identify financial holding companies by using the COMPUSTAT segment 
database and firm 10-K reports. We consider an insurance company a financial holding company if the firm 
reports any  non-insurance financial services segments, such as Asset Management, Financial Products, 
Investment Management, and Financial Services (with SIC 62XX or NAICS 523XXX). If such information is 
not available, we refer to a firm’s 10-K reports to identify whether the firm has non-insurance financial services 
business.  
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LANAL           = log(1+number of analysts following stock i during year t) 
LSTD               = log of daily stock return standard deviation  
LPRC               = log of closing stock price at the end of the year  
LVOL              = log of average daily trading volume 
In the regression testing of whether or not the market perceives the differences of 
opaqueness in multi-class structured bonds with different ratings, we split PUBMULTI into 
PUBMULTID and PUBMULTIO, and split PRIMULTI into PRIMULTID and PRIMULTIO, 
where  
PUBMULTID = the ratio of  NAIC-1 graded publicly traded multi-class structured bonds to total   
assets 
PUBMULTIO = the ratio of  NAIC-2 and lower grade publicly traded multi-class structured 
bonds to total assets 
PRIMULTID   = the ratio of NAIC-1 graded privately placed multi-class structured bonds to   
total assets   
PRIMULTID   = the ratio of NAIC-2 and lower grade privately placed multi-class structured   
bonds to total assets   
The dependent variables of the regressions are the opaqueness measures of insurance 
firms; that is, the average of quoted bid-ask spread and the dispersion in the analysts’ earnings 
forecast are used as dependent variables.  
 The key independent variables are the four structured bond holdings variables: 
PUBSINGLE, PRISINGLE, PUBMULTI, and PRIMULTI. We expect PRIMULTI, the 
percentage of private multi-class structured bond holdings to total assets, to be strongly 
positively associated with the opaqueness of the insurance company. We expect that 
PUBMULTI, the percentage of publicly traded multi-class structured bond holdings to total 
assets, to have a relationship that is not as strong as PRIMULTI but still positive. PUBSINGLE 
and PRISINGLE are the proportion of public and private pass-throughs. Pass-throughs are also 
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securitized assets, but the risk of their underlying assets is passed through to the final investor, 
the insurance company; therefore, we do not expect pass-throughs to be more opaque than most 
of the other assets of the insurance company. PRISINGLE could add opaqueness to an insurer’s 
assets because private bonds, a type of investment analogous to bank loans, can be opaque by 
nature. It is difficult for public market investors to evaluate borrowers in private placement 
markets due to information asymmetry, and the deal value is usually too small to secure a public 
offering. Borrowers and lenders negotiate the lending terms and conditions, but the information 
is not available to public investors (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 2001; Kwan and Carleton, 
2004).  
The remaining independent variables control for other opaque asset and liability factors, 
firm characteristics, and market microstructure variables that might be associated with a firm’s 
opaqueness, as shown in the existing literature. We first control for other types of opaque assets 
of insurance companies (OOPAQUE). Traditionally, investment in mortgage loans and real 
estate are considered opaque assets of insurance firms, but no empirical evidence shows that 
such assets add opaqueness to insurance companies (Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness, 2009). Bonds 
used to be viewed as transparent assets of insurance firms; however, as argued in previous 
sections, structured bonds, by the nature of their design, are very opaque to the investors, and 
non-structured private bonds, by the nature of their transactions, could be considered opaque as 
well. As a result, after singling out the structured bonds, we combine investments in mortgage 
loans, real estate, and non-structured private bonds as other opaque assets. We do not have strong 
predictions regarding this variable, since existing literature does not find that these assets are 
actually opaque.  
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Following Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009), we also control for opaque liabilities. 
Unlike other financial institutions, insurance companies operate with risky liabilities. The degree 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry varies across lines of business. Certain lines, such as 
long-tail commercial lines (e.g. worker’s compensation or commercial liability lines) are more 
information intensive and are exposed to higher pricing errors; thus, not only is the proprietary 
cost high but there is also more opportunity for manipulation. We construct opaque liability 
variables for the property-liability business (PCOPA) by including the long-tail lines of 
business,15 mortgage guarantees, financial guarantees, and credit insurance. The latter three lines 
are considered opaque liabilities because the risk and uncertainty of these lines are expected to 
be higher, as shown by the recent financial crisis. We also classify life-health insurance lines into 
opaque and transparent lines. During the crisis period, many life insurance companies 
experienced negative underwriting profits from variable annuities and life insurance products 
with guaranteed return policy terms. Variable annuities and life products’ investment assets are 
in separate accounts of LH insurers, and their risk usually is not insurers’ risk. However, the 
guarantee feature, which requires insurers to match certain minimum returns under some 
circumstances, makes these products risky for insurers. Furthermore, the information on the 
amount of variable products that insurers sold and the amount of obligated guarantee is often not 
disclosed. The lines of business classification available for LH insurers are industrial life, 
ordinary (individual) life and annuities, group life and annuities, credit life, and accident and 
health lines. We expect that most of the variable products with investment features and guarantee 
                                      
15
 We follow the definition of Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), defining the following as long-tail lines: 
farmowners multiple peril, homeowners multiple peril, commercial multiple peril, ocean marine, medical 
malpractice, workers’ compensation, other liability, product liability, auto liability, aircraft, international, and 
reinsurance. 
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options are individual life and annuities lines. Therefore, we classify individual life and annuity 
as relatively more opaque LH lines of business. We also add credit life to the opaque liability set 
(LHOPA) because we expect that the rapid changes in the real estate and mortgage market may 
increase the risk of credit life insurance. As shown by A. M. Best, for financially impaired life 
companies, individual life, credit life, and individual annuity often dominate these firms’ 
business portfolios (A. M. Best, 2010). As a result, these lines are considered relatively more 
opaque or risky.  
In addition to the three opaque asset and liability variables, we include a control variable 
for financial holding companies. AIG, one such holding company, suffered huge losses during 
the recent financial crisis due to CDS transactions conducted by its Financial Products Unit 
(Harrington, 2009); this fact may indicate that such transactions might have increased the 
opaqueness of insurance companies during recent years. In fact, insurance regulations prohibit 
insurance companies from writing CDS (Harrington, 2009), but financial holding companies 
such as AIG could have such transactions in their non-insurance investment operations. Since the 
SEC 10-K does not provide standardized complete information on CDS transactions, we proxy it 
by identifying whether an insurance company is a financial holding company. Following the 
method used in Egginton et al. (2010), we define FINHOLD equal to one if a firm reports any 
non-insurance financial services segments such as asset management, financial products, 
investment management, or financial services, and zero otherwise.  
 We generally follow Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009) and Flannery, Kwan, and 
Nimalendran (2004) for other control variables. Both the analysts’ forecast dispersion and the 
bid-ask spreads are affected by a company’s uncertainty, so we control the standard deviation of 
stock returns in the model. The number of analysts is controlled because more analysts may 
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reduce the opaqueness. Finally, market microstructure literature reports evidence that trading 
volume and price are correlated with bid-ask spreads, so we include average trading volume and 
stock price in the regression. We also control for firm characteristics such as size, debt-to-asset 
ratio, and market-to-book ratio.  
  The structured bonds became more complex and became toxic assets when subprime 
mortgages flooded into the market in recent years. Therefore, we run separate regressions for the 
periods of 1998-2004 and 2005-2008 in order to examine the increased opaqueness of structured 
bonds over time.    
Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our sample of publicly traded insurance companies. The 
quoted bid-ask spread in our sample is 1.27 percent on average. Analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion is 0.05 on average. The number of observation of dispersion is smaller than that of the 
quoted spread because only insurers with at least two analysts are included in the sample.    
On the asset side, on average, about 14 percent of insurers’ assets are structured bonds, 
and they are mostly publicly traded. Publicly traded multi-class bonds with an NAIC-1 rating 
(PUBMULTID), on average, account for 5.68 percent of insurers’ assets. The privately traded 
multi-class structured bonds (PRIMULTI), which are expected to be the most complicated and 
opaque, on average account for 0.48 percent of insurers’ assets, and within this category, about 
67 percent have an NAIC-2 to -6 rating (PRIMULTIO) (which accounts for 0.32 percent of 
insurers’ assets). On the liability side, about 55 percent of premiums are from long-tail lines and 
guarantee lines of business (PAOPA), and 14 percent are from ordinary life, credit life, and 
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individual annuity lines of business (LHOPA). About 21 percent of our sample has a financial 
holding company dummy equal to one.  
Regression Results 
Public vs. private structured bonds  
Table 3 presents the regression results testing the opaqueness of public and private structured 
bonds without considering their ratings. As expected, private multi-class bonds, which include 
CDOs, have the strongest positive relation with opaqueness of insurance companies during the 
period of 2005-2008. The coefficients of PRIMULTI and PUBMULTI in both bid-ask spread 
and dispersion regressions are significantly positive, suggesting that both privately and publicly 
traded multi-class structured bonds are viewed as opaque assets in 2005-2008. However, the 
coefficient of publicly traded structured bonds (PUBMULTI) is less than half of that of privately 
placed structured bonds (PRIMULTI), suggesting that the magnitude of opaqueness is smaller 
for publicly traded structured bonds. Similarly, private pass-throughs (PRISINGLE) have 
positive coefficients in 2005-2008 regressions, but the coefficients are smaller than the 
coefficients of PRIMULTI. Although publicly traded pass-throughs (PUBSINGLE) include 
mortgage loans as underlying assets, the regression results show that they are rather transparent.  
 None of the structured bonds variables is significant in the 1998-2004 regressions except 
for PUBMULTI in the dispersion regression. The toxic assets, such as sub-prime mortgages, 
flooded into the structured product market beginning in 2005, and the increase in opaqueness of 
structured products began then as well. The regression results in general suggest that the market 
did not view structured bonds as opaque assets before 2005.  
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 The results for other opaque asset and liability variables indicate that the assets we 
categorize as opaque (OOPAQUE), such as real estate, mortgage, and non-structured private 
bonds, are not related to the opaqueness of the insurance company. This result is consistent with 
the findings in Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009), where they find no correlation between asset 
composition and the opaqueness of insurance companies. It seems that Zhang, Cox, and Van 
Ness find no relation between asset composition and the firm opaqueness because they do not 
single out structured bonds from other types of bonds, whereas in our study, we include separate 
variables for structured bonds. In addition, their sample period was from 1996-2004, a period 
prior to the complicated structuring processes and influx of toxic assets, such as subprime 
mortgages, into the market.  
The results for the liability composition suggest that PC long-tail lines and financial 
guarantee lines (PCOPA) do not increase the opaqueness of the insurance company. While we 
find no relation on the PC side, the LH line of business variable (LHOPA) is positive and 
significant in the 2005-2008 bid-ask spread regression, suggesting that the increased uncertainty 
about the various guarantees provided by insurers for variable products during the recent years 
(A. M. Best, 2010) could increase the opaqueness of these lines of business.  
 Results for other covariates, such as market microstructure variables and corporate 
finance factors, are mostly consistent with existing literature. For example, as a stock has more 
analysts following it and a lower stock return deviation, it has a smaller bid-ask spread and 
dispersion. We find that the market-to-book ratio (GROWTH) is insignificant in the 1998-2004 
regressions and significantly positive in the 2005-2008 regressions. Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness 
(2009) also find the growth variable negative and insignificant with their sample. This suggests 
that the market did not perceive growing insurance companies as more opaque before 2005, but 
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that market makers and analysts had informational problems with growing insurers during the 
unstable economic period.  
Rating of structured bonds and their opaqueness 
The NAIC provides rating information on multi-class structured bonds. In Schedule D of the 
NAIC annual report, both private and public multi-class structured bonds are classified into two 
categories: Defined MBS/ABS and Other MBS/ABS. Multi-class structured bonds rated NAIC-1 
are in the Multi-Class Defined MBS/ABS category, and multi-class structured bonds rated 
NAIC-2 or below are in Multi-Class Other MBS/ABS category. No rating information is 
available for pass-through securities. In this section, we test the effects of bond rating on the 
opaqueness of structured bonds. We include four new variables (PUBMULTID, PUBMULTIO, 
PRIMULTID, and PRIMULTIO) instead of the two multi-class structured bond variables 
(PUBMULTI and PRIMULTI) in the regressions. 
 Most publicly traded bonds are rated by major rating agencies such as Moody’s and S&P. 
However, privately placed bonds are not rated by bond rating agencies in many cases (Kwan and 
Carleton, 2004). Instead, the NAIC provides credit ratings for non-rated private bonds in insurers’ 
assets for solvency regulation purposes. It is expected that weak credit quality bonds have higher 
risks and thus have positive associations with bid-ask spreads and dispersion. However, this 
relation may be unclear because NAIC-1 rated bonds could have the same degree of complexity, 
and the lost credibility of rating agencies and inflated rating grades provided by such agencies 
may raise investors’ doubts about the quality of NAIC-1 rated bonds. As shown in Table 2, most 
public multi-class structured bonds in insurance companies’ assets have an NAIC-1 rating, and 
two-thirds of private multi-class structured bonds have ratings of NAIC-2 or lower. In this sense, 
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it is interesting to examine how the market perceives the opaqueness of structured bonds with 
different ratings. The regression results are reported in Table 4.  
 Private multi-class bonds with NAIC-2 ratings or lower (PRIMULTIO) are shown to be 
the most opaque assets in the 2005-2008 regressions. Combined with the results of Table 3, it 
suggests that the opaqueness of private multi-class structured bonds primarily comes from the 
bonds with high default risks. Interestingly, the results for publicly traded structured bonds 
reveal a different relation. Public bonds with NAIC-1 ratings (PUBMULTID) increase the 
opaqueness of insurance companies, whereas public bonds with NAIC-2 or lower ratings 
(PUBMULTIO) do not have a significant relationship with firm opaqueness. This suggests that 
the strong ratings provided by rating agencies do not resolve information asymmetry between 
insurance companies and their investors on the quality of these bonds. Our results provide some 
evidence that public rating agencies may actually bias their ratings on structured bonds upward 
and that a reform of the rating agency system is in fact necessary.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the opaqueness of structured bonds from a capital 
markets perspective by studying publicly traded insurance companies in the U.S. By 
concentrating on one industry, we can have a more homogeneous sample, which can provide 
cleaner results than cross-industry studies and is free of dramatic contamination from opaque off-
balance sheet financial reporting. This article is the first empirical examination of the frequently 
discussed problem of structured bond opaqueness, which is considered as one of the important 
causes of the recent financial crisis. Methodologically, this study is an extension of previous 
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works on the opaqueness of insurance companies by Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009) and the 
opaqueness of bank holding companies by Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004).  
We first show that insurance companies are one of the major investors in structured 
bonds.  We argue that the opaqueness of structured bonds in insurers’ assets will cause market 
makers and analysts difficulty in evaluating insurance company stocks, thus increasing bid-ask 
spreads and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. We hypothesize that the opaqueness of 
structured bonds increases as the structure becomes more complex and contains more private 
information. In other words, privately placed and multi-class structured bonds should be more 
opaque than other types of structured bonds. 
The paper finds that publicly traded single-class structured bonds are rather transparent 
compared to other assets, multi-class structured bonds are more opaque than single-class, and 
privately placed multi-class structured bonds the most opaque in insurers’ assets. Structured 
bonds are only found to be considered opaque during the 2005-2008 period, when the 
complexity of bonds increased and toxic assets flooded into the asset pools. This suggests that 
securitized assets or mortgage related assets themselves are not necessarily opaque. It is the 
complex structure process and insufficient disclosure of information that make these assets more 
opaque to investors.  
Rating information on the structured bonds should reduce the opaqueness of these assets. 
However, our results show that strong AAA/AA ratings from rating agencies do not close the 
information gap; rather, they increase this gap. In contrast, it seems that good rating information 
on private bonds, which usually are provided by NAIC rather than by rating agencies, reduces 
the opaqueness.  
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Overall, this paper provides strong empirical evidence that structured bonds, especially 
privately placed multi-class bonds, are opaque to the market and investors. In addition, the 
opaqueness of publicly traded multi-class structured bonds with strong ratings suggests that firms 
and regulators should be careful when using rating information provided by the public rating 
agencies in making their investment decisions, since the market and general investors may 
perceive the ratings differently. 
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Figure 1: Growth of CDOs  
 
Source: SIGFA.org 
Note: Numbers are in millions. “Total CDOs” is total CDO issuance and “Structured in CDOs” 
is the total structured bonds included in the CDO asset pools.  
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Table 1. Summary of Structured Bonds in Insurers’ Assets, Median Value 
Panel A. Life-Health Insurance Industry  
Year N N1 N1/N 
Single-
class* 
% Asset 
_Single 
N2 N2/N Multi-class* 
% Asset 
_Multi 
1998 842 484 57% 99,513 4.90% 355 42% 260,264 9.19% 
1999 751 442 59% 97,728 4.97% 349 46% 268,824 8.66% 
2000 694 414 60% 100,577 4.89% 327 47% 297,409 9.14% 
2001 658 416 63% 134,630 4.77% 323 49% 286,719 7.96% 
2002 618 396 64% 173,343 4.85% 320 52% 321,818 8.67% 
2003 591 381 64% 176,889 4.74% 302 51% 360,645 9.28% 
2004 563 371 66% 207,683 4.79% 301 53% 380,383 9.76% 
2005 539 364 68% 212,994 4.09% 293 54% 445,984 10.69% 
2006 514 352 68% 246,627 3.67% 284 55% 715,793 11.20% 
2007 492 340 69% 215,843 4.11% 284 58% 584,698 11.75% 
2008 468 331 71% 212,917 3.78% 283 60% 599,947 11.43% 
 
Panel B. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry  
Year N N1 N1/N Single-
class* 
% Asset 
_Single 
N2 N2/N Multi-class* % Asset 
_Multi 
1998 1353 710 52% 36,220 5.24% 537 40% 48,171 5.34% 
1999 1260 671 53% 38,302 5.43% 521 41% 48,919 5.20% 
2000 1220 659 54% 47,064 5.80% 503 41% 50,306 5.96% 
2001 1212 645 53% 50,590 5.73% 496 41% 53,255 5.39% 
2002 1202 650 54% 60,252 6.09% 515 43% 61,216 5.40% 
2003 1253 664 53% 63,252 6.17% 499 40% 63,804 5.63% 
2004 1313 680 52% 65,154 6.28% 512 39% 69,821 5.88% 
2005 1333 689 52% 66,594 6.29% 547 41% 84,552 6.34% 
2006 1374 689 50% 71,731 6.56% 538 39% 111,634 7.18% 
2007 1400 696 50% 73,341 6.48% 540 39% 112,639 7.68% 
2008 1403 698 50% 64,605 6.73% 534 38% 104,920 7.02% 
Note: * This is industry-aggregated total investment. Numbers are in millions and in 2005 dollars. 
Data Source: calculated from NAIC database for  property-casualty and life-health industry. The 
calculation includes all companies (insurance groups and unaffiliated single firms) in the 
industry, regardless of their public trading status. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables for Regression Analysis 
Variable N Mean Median Min Max STD 
QSPREAD 1134 1.27% 0.45% 0.01% 17.84% 2.07% 
DISP 537 0.05 0.03 0.00 1.18 0.11 
PUBSINGLE 1134 4.46% 2.42% 0.00% 45.08% 5.38% 
PRISINGLE 1134 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 21.75% 0.77% 
PUBMULTI 1134 7.38% 4.90% 0.00% 71.07% 8.80% 
PRIMULTI 1134 0.48% 0.00% 0.00% 11.87% 1.09% 
PUBMULTID 1134 5.68% 2.79% 0.00% 71.07% 8.10% 
PUBMULTIO 1134 1.61% 0.37% 0.00% 34.77% 2.92% 
PRIMULTID 1134 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 3.97% 0.43% 
PRIMULTIO 1134 0.32% 0.00% 0.00% 11.87% 0.90% 
OOPAQUE 1134 5.08% 2.06% 0.00% 55.56% 7.52% 
PCOPA 1134 54.65% 66.44% 0.00% 100.00% 37.39% 
LHOPA 1134 14.16% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 25.20% 
FINHOLD 1134 0.21 0 0 1 0.4 
LASSET 1134 8.37 8.21 2.79 14.47 2.25 
LEVER 1134 0.76 0.78 0.01 0.97 0.15 
GROWTH 1134 0.07 0.03 -0.72 1.75 0.22 
LANAL 1134 1.82 2.08 0.00 3.53 1.05 
LVOL 1134 11.41 11.58 5.29 17.96 2.19 
LPRC 1134 3.25 3.33 -0.97 11.86 1.28 
LSTD 1134 -3.79 -3.84 -4.97 -1.90 0.52 
Note: Percentages are presented in this table for some variables, but raw numbers are used in the 
regression analysis for all variables.   
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Table 3. Regression Analysis: Privately Placed vs. Publicly Traded Structured Bonds 
 QSPREAD QSPREAD DISP DISP 
 1998-2004 2005-2008 1998-2004 2005-2008 
PUBSINGLE -0.0003 -0.0043*** 0.0779 0.0194 
 [-0.0576] [-3.4726] [1.5420] [0.1996] 
PRISINGLE -0.0254 0.0190* 0.0114 0.2664 
 [-1.3420] [1.8578] [0.0300] [0.4795] 
PUBMULTI 0.0016 0.0027** 0.1012** 0.2318*** 
 [0.3345] [2.1654] [2.5681] [3.1302] 
PRIMULTI -0.0141 0.0363*** -0.0124 0.4921*** 
 [-0.6315] [8.6612] [-0.0875] [2.9024] 
OOPAQUE -0.0035 -0.0019 -0.0514 0.0887 
 [-0.5648] [-1.2938] [-1.3863] [1.0729] 
PCOPA -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0034 -0.0290 
 [-0.0881] [0.6307] [-0.3648] [-0.6151] 
LHOPA -0.0013 0.0022*** -0.0127 -0.0199 
 [-0.5376] [3.9009] [-0.9631] [-0.6878] 
FINHOLD 0.0013 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0186 
 [1.2479] [-0.0512] [0.0020] [-0.9670] 
LASSET 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0048 0.0539*** 
 [0.9533] [1.2680] [-0.9268] [3.2136] 
LEVER -0.0041 -0.0015** 0.0000 0.1121*** 
 [-1.1990] [-1.9791] [0.0003] [2.9983] 
GROWTH -0.0006 0.0008** -0.0169 0.0642*** 
 [-0.3749] [1.9878] [-1.4157] [2.8436] 
LANAL 0.0006 -0.0003* -0.0065 -0.0537*** 
 [1.2919] [-1.8218] [-1.3007] [-4.7057] 
LSTD 0.0028*** 0.0003* -0.0023 -0.0061 
 [4.0704] [1.7126] [-0.3170] [-0.8480] 
LVOL -0.0012*** -0.0008*** 0.0148*** -0.0160** 
 [-3.5237] [-8.2439] [3.8093] [-2.2544] 
LPRC -0.0025*** -0.0015*** -0.0036 -0.0243*** 
 [-4.4758] [-14.9117] [-0.8570] [-5.1495] 
N 691 441 315 229 
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.987 0.979 0.754 
Note: Firm and year fixed effects are included but not reported here. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in brackets show t-value.  
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Table 4. Regression Analysis: Structured Bonds with Different Rating Categories 
 QSPREAD QSPREAD DISP DISP 
 1998-2004 2005-2008 1998-2004 2005-2008 
PUBSINGLE 0.0008 -0.0029** 0.0697 0.0653 
 [0.1667] [-2.4398] [1.2758] [0.6465] 
PRISINGLE -0.0239 0.0156 -0.0891 -0.2134 
 [-1.2782] [1.5952] [-0.2203] [-0.3373] 
PUBMULTID 0.0053 0.0044*** 0.0949** 0.1371 
 [1.0176] [3.4262] [2.1565] [1.2426] 
PUBMULTIO -0.0117 -0.0014 -0.0480 -0.0299 
 [-1.0568] [-0.6940] [-0.4838] [-0.3206] 
PRIMULTID -0.1170 -0.0020 -0.1449 0.4038 
 [-1.6232] [-0.1758] [-0.3985] [0.7638] 
PRIMULTIO -0.0034 0.0441*** -0.1434 1.0319*** 
 [-0.1449] [9.8534] [-0.8507] [5.3142] 
OOPAQUE -0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0377 0.1305 
 [-0.1982] [-1.1716] [-0.9513] [1.5163] 
PCOPA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0277 
 [-0.0480] [-0.1175] [-0.2818] [-0.5601] 
LHOPA -0.0017 0.0022*** -0.0116 -0.0133 
 [-0.7064] [4.0763] [-0.8308] [-0.4425] 
LIQUID 0.0015 -0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0148 
 [1.4507] [-0.0506] [-0.4755] [-0.7396] 
LASSET 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0023 0.0417** 
 [1.3183] [1.4594] [-0.4107] [2.3915] 
LEVER -0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0022 0.1386*** 
 [-1.4409] [-1.5512] [-0.0598] [3.5061] 
GROWTH -0.0000 0.0008* -0.0165 0.0585** 
 [-0.0195] [1.8713] [-1.2937] [2.4765] 
LANAL 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0092* -0.0503*** 
 [1.5859] [-1.6131] [-1.7196] [-4.2462] 
LSTD 0.0028*** 0.0003** -0.0035 -0.0107 
 [4.1081] [2.1567] [-0.4443] [-1.4211] 
LVOL -0.0013*** -0.0008*** 0.0153*** -0.0159** 
 [-3.6957] [-8.1328] [3.6777] [-2.1524] 
LPRC -0.0027*** -0.0014*** -0.0040 -0.0247*** 
 [-4.9599] [-14.4874] [-0.8792] [-4.9191] 
N 692 440 299 233 
Adjusted R2 0.966 0.988 0.977 0.741 
Note: Firm and year fixed effects are included but not reported here. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in brackets show t-value.  
 
